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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. ] 
STEVEN D. MABEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
i Case No. 900175-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (d) , 1953 as amended, and 
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal followed a final judgment of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Utah, Washington County, St. George Department, Criminal 
Case. No. 892004212, finding the Defendant guilty of failing to 
yield the right-of-way in violation of Sec. 41-6-73 of the St. 
George City Code, an infraction. At the trial before the Court 
on February 22, 1990, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion for 
Continuance. The Court entered its judgment finding the 
1 
Defendant guilty and imposed a fine against the Defendant of 
$45.00, which fine was paid by the Defendant on February 22, 
1990. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying the 
Defendant's motion for a continuance of the trial made at the 
commencement of the trial, where a prior continuance had been 
granted and where the Defendant failed to show that he had 
exercised due diligence in obtaining witnesses in his favor. 
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to 
support the trial court's judgment finding the Defendant guilty 
of violating Sec. 41-6-73, St. George City Code. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Sec. 41-6-73, St. George City Code, as adopted, stating: 
"The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left 
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle as to 
constitute an immediate hazard." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff disputes the statements of fact set forth by 
the Defendant in that such facts are not supported by, but indeed 
are contradicted by, the record in this case. The material 
facts, as supported by the record herein, are as follows: 
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On November 1, 1989, a collision occurred between vehicles 
driven by the Defendant and Ms. Gretchen Goulding. The collision 
occurred at the intersection of Brigham Rd. and Pioneer Rd. 
within the limits of the City of St. George, Utah. (Trans, p.7, 
1.7-15; p.8, 1.16-21). When the collision occurred, the 
Defendant was traveling west on Brigham Rd. and Ms. Goulding was 
traveling east on Brigham Rd. (Trans, p.8, 1.22-24; p.9, 1.4-6). 
The Defendant, upon reaching the intersection of Brigham Rd. and 
Pioneer Rd. made a left-hand turn into the path of the vehicle 
driven by Ms. Goulding and the collision occurred. (Trans, p. 9, 
1.7-11; p.18, 1.2-5). An investigation of the collision 
indicated that the Defendant was at fault for failing to yield 
the right-of-way to Ms. Goulding's vehicle. (Trans, p.9, 1.19-
24) . 
There is no indication that Ms. Goulding ever saw the 
Defendant signal his turn. (Trans, p.17, 1.25 through p.18, 1.1; 
p.23, 1.24-25). Contrary to the Defendant's statements in his 
brief, Ms. Goulding was not in a hurry at the time of the 
collision (Trans, p.21, 1.16-18, 22-25); and there was no 
evidence that either vehicle was traveling at an excessive or 
illegal speed at the time of the collision. (Trans, p.9, 1.12-
18; p.18, 1.6-7; p.22, 1.10-12; p.31, 1.5-6; p.40, 1.23-25; 
p.41, 1.1-2). 
3 
Ms. Goulding's vehicle was approximately one car length from 
the Defendant's vehicle when she realized the Defendant was 
turning in front of her. Ms. Goulding applied her brakes but was 
unable to stop her vehicle before colliding with the Defendant's 
vehicle. (Trans, p.28, 1.11-15; p.18, 1.12-16; p.28, 1.19-24). 
The Defendant's main contention to the trial court was that 
he was first to enter the intersection (Trans, p.31, 1.15-16) and 
Ms. Goulding had ample time to stop her vehicle in order to let 
the Defendant complete his left turn through the intersection 
(Trans, p.33, 1.20-22; p.34, 1.6-12, 1.22-25; p.38, 1.22-24; 
p.39, 1.2-5). 
At the commencement of the trial in this matter, the 
Defendant sought a continuance of the trial to allow him more 
time to locate alleged witnesses and to obtain counsel (Trans, 
p.3, 1.23 through p.4, 1.5; p.5, 1.8-18). The court denied the 
continuance as the trial had already been continued once and the 
Defendant had failed to show due diligence in preparing his case 
for trial or in his efforts to obtain counsel (Trans, p.6, 1.15-
25) . 
Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court found the 
Defendant guilty of failing to yield the right-of-way and this 
appeal followed (Trans, p.41, 1.11-12). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Whether a request for continuance should be granted lies in 
the sound discretion of the trial court. As the Defendant failed 
to show due diligence or sufficient cause for the continuance, 
the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the 
motion for continuance made by the Defendant at the commencement 
of the trial. 
The Defendant claims that the other driver, Ms. Goulding, 
should be found guilty of violating the City traffic code and 
that the Defendant should be found not guilty of failing to yield 
the right-of-way to Ms. Goulding. The Defendant's arguments are 
based upon an erroneous interpretation of law which he claims 
would give him the right-of-way in making a left-hand turn simply 
by virtue of his having entered the intersection first and his 
perception that Ms. Goulding could have stopped her vehicle 
before colliding with the Defendant's vehicle. There is ample 
evidence upon which the trial court could find that the Defendant 
violated the provisions of St. George City Code Sec. 41-6-73, 
making him guilty of failing to yield the right-of-way to Ms. 
Goulding's vehicle. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Defendants Motion 
for Continuance Made at the Commencement of Trial, 
At the commencement of trial, the Defendant requested that 
the trial be continued to allow him to find additional witnesses 
and to obtain counsel. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that two 
of his main witnesses were not available at trial but would have 
proved his case. Thus, the Defendant implies that the trial 
court's denial of the motion for a continuance was erroneous. 
"When a defendant in a criminal action moves for a 
continuance in order to procure the testimony of an 
absent witness, such a defendant must show that the 
testimony sought is material and admissible, that 
the witness could be produced within a reasonable 
time, and that due diligence has been exercised 
before the request for a continuance." 
State v. Creviston, 646 P. 2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) (denial of 
continuance affirmed where defendant stated only that testimony 
was "vital," content of prospective witnesses' testimony was 
speculative or likely to be inadmissible, no showing made that 
witness could be produced in a reasonable time and defendant did 
not exercise due diligence in ascertaining the value or 
availability of witnesses7 testimony or in moving for a 
continuance). See also State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109, 110 
(Utah 1985) (motion to continue trial denied where two of three 
witnesses were available at trial and need for third witness was 
speculative at best). 
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In support of his motion for continuance, the Defendant 
asserted that he had been trying to locate witnesses to the 
accident and had recently done so (Trans, p. 3, 1.2 3 through p. 5, 
1.7) . 
However, as in Creviston, the Defendant here failed to meet 
the requirements for a continuance as set forth above. The 
Defendant proffered no indication as to when the proposed 
witnesses might be available, or what the content of their 
testimony might be. Additionally, no explanation was made as to 
why such witnesses could not have otherwise been located during 
the approximately four months between the collision and the trial 
of this matter. 
The trial court specifically found that there was no showing 
that the Defendant had exercised due diligence and thus, denied 
the Defendant's motion to continue the trial. 
"It is well established in Utah . . . that the granting of a 
continuance is at the discretion of the trial judge, whose 
decision will not be reversed . . . absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion." State v. Humpherys, 707 P. 2d at 109; State v. 
Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752. In doing so, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the continuance and such denial 
should be upheld. 
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B. The Judgment of the Trial Court is Supported by the 
Evidence Presented at Trial and Should be Affirmed, 
The Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court's 
judgment should be reversed and Ms, Goulding, the driver of the 
other vehicle involved in the collision, should be found "guilty 
of speeding and other charges." Defendant's brief at p,2. It is 
evident from the Defendant's arguments that his appeal is based 
upon his disagreement with the trial court's evaluation of the 
evidence presented at trial and his misunderstanding of the law 
under which he was found guilty. 
Based upon the facts presented, the trial court found that 
the Defendant failed to yield the right-of-way to Ms. Goulding's 
vehicle (Trans, p.40, 1.8-10). In reviewing the trial court's 
judgment, "the function of this Court 'is not to determine guilt 
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the 
credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given defendant's 
testimony.'" State v. Goriick. 605 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1979). 
Rather, in cases such as this where the sufficiency of the 
evidence is challenged, this Court will: 
review the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983). "When there is any evidence including 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, 
from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can be reasonably made, [the Court's] 
inquiry stops, and [the Court] sustain[s] the verdict." 
State v. Gehrinq. 694 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1984). 
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State v. Udell. 728 P.2d 131, 132 (Utah 1986). The Court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, State 
v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1983), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987), and the 
verdict will not be overturned unless there is a clear showing of 
lack of evidence or that the evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not reasonably 
believe the Defendant had committed a crime. State v. Gabaldon, 
735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). See also State v. 
Bergwerff, 777 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial courts 
judgment against the Defendant adequately establishes that all 
the requisite elements of the offense of which the Defendant was 
charged were met. Sec. 41-6-73, as adopted by Sec. 12-1-1988 of 
the St. George City Code, required that the Defendant yield the 
right-of-way to Ms. Goulding prior to making his left turn. 
The trial court, as the trier of fact, weighed the evidence and 
testimony presented to it and found the Defendant guilty of 
failing to yield the right-of-way as required. At trial Ms. 
Goulding testified the Defendant failed to yield the right-of-way 
and turned in front of her without her having a chance to avoid 
the collision by stopping. The investigating officer also 
testified that the Defendant had failed to yield the right-of-way 
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to Ms, Goulding7s vehicle. The fact that the collision occurred 
evidences that Ms. Goulding's vehicle was close enough to the 
Defendant's vehicle to constitute an immediate hazard to the 
turning vehicle. Indeed, the Defendant's own arguments at trial, 
and here on appeal, support the trial court's judgment. 
The Defendant argues that Ms. Goulding saw that the 
Defendant was making a left turn and "did not slow down or 
respect that I was already in my turn when she saw me in the car. 
The law requires that she should slow down to let me make my turn 
since I was in the intersection first and my turn signal was on 
in advance of the turn and she saw the signal." Defendant's 
brief at p. 2. The traffic code provides that the Defendant, as 
the driver of the turning vehicle, must yield the right-of-way to 
oncoming traffic. The Defendant's argument that Ms. Goulding saw 
his vehicle and had time to stop, and should have stopped to let 
him complete his turn through the intersection, only serves to 
further evidence that the Defendant violated the cited statute by 
failing to yield the right-of-way. The fact that the Defendant 
was first into the intersection and that Ms. Goulding may have 
had time to stop prior to colliding with the Defendant is 
irrelevant. If Ms. Goulding was required to stop, or even slow, 
her vehicle in order to avoid a collision with the Defendant, the 
Defendant is guilty of violating the provisions of Sec. 41-6-73. 
The evidence presented certainly supports such a finding. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Defendant carries the burden on appeal of showing that 
the trial court was in error. State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 
(Utah 1985); State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982). 
This the Defendant has failed to do. The trial court properly 
denied the Defendant's motion to continue the trial based upon 
the Defendant's lack of due diligence in preparing his case. The 
trial court, as the trier of fact, also weighed the testimony and 
evidence presented at trial and found a clear-cut case against 
the Defendant. The judgment entered against the Defendant by the 
trial court is amply supported by the record herein. Thus, the 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
judgment entered by the trial court against the Defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //S day of May, 1990. 
Attorney for City of St. George 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correctpopies 
of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent, this //^ t£ day 
of May, 1990, to Steven D. Mabey, 1021 So. Valley View Drive, St. 
George, Utah 84770. 
Gar^G./iCuhlm 
:x>ey Attorne for City of St. George 
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I JUDGMENT 
Case No. 892004212 
The above matter having come on for trial before the Court 
on February 22, 1990, pursuant to notice sent to Defendant, the 
Plaintiff City of St, George appeared through its attorney, T. W. 
Shumway, and the Defendant appeared in person without counsel. 
The Defendant moved for a continuance in order to obtain the 
attendance of witnesses not present, but the Court denied the 
motion as the Defendant was aware of the trial date and had 
already had sufficient opportunity to prepare for trial; also 
there had been a previous continuance at the request of 
Defendant. The court proceeded to try the matter, and based upon 
the witnesses and evidence presented, the court found the 
Defendant guilty as charged. The Defendant was sentenced to pay 
a fine of $36.00 on the charge of failure to yield (Sec. 41-6-73, 
St. George City Code as adopted), an infraction,, together with a 
State Fee of $9.00, for a total of $45.00 due and payable as of 
this date, 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 22nd day of February, 1990. 
Circuit Court Judge 
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FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, S T . GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STEVEN MABEY, 
Defendant. 
TRIAL 
Case No. 892004212 
* * 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 22nd day of 
February, 1990, the above-entitled matter came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Judge 
of the above-named Court, at the Washington County Hali 
of Justice, St. George, Utah, and that the following 
proceedings were had: 
APPEARANCES; 
For the Plaintiff: 
The Defendant appeared pro se. 
Theodore W. Shumway, 
St. George City Attorney 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. 
CERTIF IED SHORTHAND REPORTER 1 
THE COURT: The next case is Steven D. Mabey, 
failure to yield. And the record may show the defendant is 
present and, let's see, Officer Stratton, let's see if 
the Information needs to be signed. Go ahead and be seated, 
Mr. Mabey. 
Do you solemnly swear the allegations of the Information 
you just signed and testimony you're about to give in the 
case before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth so help you God? 
MARLON STRATTON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: All right, you may take the stand. 
Mr. Shumway, you'll be handling this case, is that 
correct? 
MR. SHUMWAY: Yes, your Honor. 
STEVEN MABEY: Uh, your Honor? Can I request a 
cont — I want to request on the record a continuance. Can 
I do that now? 
THE COURT: You can make that motion, yes. 
STEVEN MABEY: Do I make it right now? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
STEVEN MABEY: Okay. I wanted to make a motion 
for a continuance of this trial for two basic reasons: 
The first reason is, is that I have been trying, since 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . JR . 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
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the time of the accident, to locate one of about — anywhere 
from about six to eight people that were out front of the 
video store and out front of the convenience store during 
that time. And for various reasons, the people haven't 
seemed to be very cooperative. One person volunteered that 
she knew people, her name is Jennifer Harrison. She worked 
at the convenience store at Bloomington. And then she 
went away for vacation, came back, then she said that she 
could not locate the people because she did not know their 
names. She only knew them by their face. And therefore, 
I said to try to keep going — to look for these people, 
because she did know them, and she did know of at least 
two people that she knew of. And she saw the accident also. 
She couldn't come this morning because she had a test 
at school. 
And then as of Sunday, this last Sunday, just a few 
days ago, I had been repeatedly, discreetly, trying to 
follow up to see if she had — if the people had come to the 
store* And she said the one girl usually came in for drinks, 
had not been in. And then the girl came in, I'm not sure 
exactly when, but Saturday or so, before this last Sunday, 
which is only a few days ago, and she got her name. 
So only at about 6:30 on Saturday night, just a few 
days ago, I got the name of the witness, talked to the wit-
ness and she referred me to two other people, they knew one 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R . 
CKRTirico SHORTHAND REPORTER 
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more, and I have not been able to track down the other 
person that knew the majority of the information- And I 
was not able to get these people in this short of time to 
come to court, or subpoena them. And that's the first 
reason that I would like to ask for a continuance, because 
the major part of the evidence to prove my case, I cannot 
do without these witnesses. 
And the second part of the reason is that I tried to 
obtain a lawyer to help me with this matter, because I 
felt that there was enough complication for me on my part 
that I wanted to get a lawyer to do it. And I finally got 
ahold of Mr, Clayton Huntsman who agreed to look at it 
about a week and a half ago, and then he got a severe case 
of the flu, put me off for several days, finally said he 
couldn't do it, referred me over to Mr. Alan Boyack. He 
couldn't do it in the time period necessary. So therefore, 
I haven't been able to retain legal counsel, and both of 
those persons are willing to file their story with the Court, 
So for the two reasons that my main evidence that I 
want to present before the Court to prove my case, because 
the witnesses are not available because of the short time 
and only came available a few days ago, not due to my fault; 
and secondly, I have not been able to retain a lawyer. 
Those are the two main reasons why I would like to 
ask for a continuance. 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R . 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 5 
THE COURT: What is the position of the City 
with respect to the motion for a continuance? 
MR. SHUMWAY: If your Honor please, this is a case 
that occurred back in November. It did involve an accident. 
We would be opposed to any further delay. I understand it's 
been continued once before. There's been no showing or 
evidence that the witnesses that the defendant refers to 
would contribute or support a defense that he might raise. 
There's more than adequate time to contact — locate an 
attorney, and I don't believe that any of the reasons he's 
given for not having an attorney would be justified on the 
grounds of dilligence, nor has there been a showing the 
witnesses would be material or helpful to his defense. 
Therefore, we would oppose the continuance. 
THE COURT: We normally hear traffic cases within 
30 to 6 0 days from the time of the incident. There was 
a previous continuance granted, and now, on this case, we're 
going on four months, so it's a very old case. 
There's been no showing of due dilligence, that is, 
last-minute preparations or attempts to get attorneys are 
never grounds for a continuance without a showing that 
for some reason it was impossible to do so in a timely 
manner. 
So, for those reasons, the motion for a continuance is 
denied. 
B Y R O N R A Y CHRIST IANSEN. JR . 
CERTIF IED SHORTHAND RKPORTC* 
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You may proceed, Mr. Shumway. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION, 
BY MR. SHUMWAY: 
Q. Please state your name and occupation. 
A. My name is Marlon Stratton. I'm employed as a 
police officer for the City of St. George. 
Q. Officer Stratton, were you so employed back on 
the 1st day of November of 1989? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Calling your attention to approximately 4 p.m. 
in the afternoon of that date, did you have occasion to be 
in the area of Brigham Road and Pioneer Road or were you 
called there? 
A. Yes. I was called to the scene of an accident 
at the intersection of Brigham Road and Pioneer Road. 
Q. Is that intersection the one immediately west of 
the Bloomington exit of the freeway? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Just before you reach the small commercial center 
there? 
A. Right. Right on the corner by the Bloomington 
Market. 
Q. Is that intersection controlled by any traffic 
control of any type? 
A. Yes, it is. 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N , JR . 
CcftTiFiiD SHORTHAND RKPORTKR 
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Q. Would you describe that for us? 
A. Yes, it's a four-way intersection. There is a 
stop sign on Pioneer Road, which would run north and south. 
Q. So traffic on the north-south, Pioneer Road, 
have to stop for east-west traffic on Brigham Road, is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. What time was it when you arrived 
there? 
A. I arrived at the scene at 4:11 p.m. 
Q. And were you able to ascertain approximately when 
the accident occurred? 
A. I was dispatched at 4:08 p.m., so I was there three 
minutes after the accident occurred. 
Q. All right. Tell us what you found when you arrivedf 
A. Upon my arrival, I found two vehicles within the 
intersection. The first vehicle was driven by Gretchen 
Goulding. That vehicle was a 1979 Chevrolet Camaro, gold 
in color. 
The second vehicle, driven by the defendant, Mr. Mabey, 
was a 1989 Eagle Medallion, which was blue in color. 
Upon my investigation, I determined that the vehicle 
driven by Gretchen Goulding, the Camaro, had been traveling 
eastbound on Brigham Road. She had apparently just left 
work, which is at Dixie REA, the building directly behind the 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R . 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 8 
Bloomington Market. She had pulled out of the parking lot 
there, turned right, and proceeded east on Brigham Road, 
As she was approaching the intersection of Brigham 
Road and Pioneer Road, the defendant, Mr. Mabey, driving the 
American — or the Eagle Medallion, had been traveling west-
bound on Brigham Road approaching Gretchen Goulding. 
From talking to both of the drivers, I determined 
that the driver, the defendant, Mr. Mabey, made a left-
hand turn from Brigham Road to turn onto Pioneer Road. 
At that time he turned into the path of Miss Goulding, in 
which a collision occurred. 
QL All right, did you have any evidence of excessive 
speed on the part of Mrs. Goulding? 
A. No. There was no evidence, whatsoever. There were 
no skid marks at the scene. I talked to Gretchen about that, 
she indicated she had just barely left the driveway and 
the defendant, Mr. Mabey, turned so quickly in front of 
her that she had no time to brake at all. 
Qi Do you have an opinion as to whether there was 
adequate time for Mr. Mabey to make a safe left turn at 
the time he did so? 
A. My opinion was that he did not have time to make 
a safe left-hand turn, that he did not yield the right-of-
way to Miss Goulding. 
QL And based on that, did you cite Mr. Mabey? 
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A. Yes. I was going from west towards the east. 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. I was heading to go under the freeway to turn left 
to go onto the freeway to come into St. George. And there 
was one car that was in front of his car. It turned left 
in the same direction that he was turning. It went through 
the intersection before I had reached the intersection. 
Q. In other words, another car going west turned 
south onto Pioneer Road before you reached the intersection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Did you see him behind that car? 
A. Yes, I did see him behind. 
Q. How far behind was he? 
A. Urn — 
Q. Car lengths — 
A. Maybe two — about two car lengths. 
Q. All right. As he came into the intersection, 
where were you? 
A. As he came into the intersection, I was just 
starting to go through the intersection. 
Q. You were coming into it also? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative) , yes, 
Q. Did you in any way signal for a turn? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he signal for a turn? 
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A. I can't remember whether he signaled or not. 
Q. Tell us what he did, 
A. Okay, He just tried to turn left in front of me 
and to get -chrough the intersection before I got through 
the intersection. 
Q. How fast were you going? 
A. Fifteen to twenty miles an hour, 20 at the most. 
Q, Could you estimate his speed? 
A. I'd say that his speed was probably going a little 
bit faster to get through the intersection before I got 
through the intersection. 
Q. All right. When you observed him turn in — in 
front of you, were you able to stop? 
A. When he started going through the intersection, 
I could see that we were going to hit, so I just slammed 
on my brakes. 
Q. When you observed him starting to turn, how far 
away was his car from your car? 
A. As his was turning left? 
Qi Yes. 
A. It was probably from here to about where he's 
seated at the desk. 
Q. All right. So there's no way you could avoid 
the accident? 
A. No. 
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drawing on the board, where — how — which — when you 
came on the highway that day, which parking lot did you 
come from? How far down the road were you? 
A. It may have been 75 to 100 yards from that inter-
section. 
STEVEN MABEY: Your Honor, this, again, is important 
in my case on speed and what she saw. If she could draw 
just one little mini drawing as to where she came out, how 
far down the road, approximately. 
MR. SHUMWAY: I?ll object to that. If your 
Honor please, she's testified 75 to 100 yards. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Steven Mabey) Okay. Let me ask you this: 
That day, you were leaving work? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Were you in a hurry that day? 
A. I wasn't in a hurry. I had an appointment that I 
was heading to. 
Qi Okay. What kind of an appointment? Was it a~ 
medical appointment or an urgent appointment of some kind? 
A. It was a medical appointment. 
Q. Medical appointment. So you were in a hurry, then, 
to make that appointment? 
A. No. I wasn't in a hurry. I had time to get to the 
appointment. 
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Q. What time was your appointment? 
A. It was 4:30. 
Q. Just one more question on the appointment. How 
far did you have to go to make that appointment at 4:30 
from the time of the accident? Was it downtown St, George 
or — 
A, Yes, it was at the hospital. 
Q. Okay. All right. Did you — in the 75 to 100 
feet, when you started out of the parking lot, normally 
how fast would you go up that street? What would — what 
was your speed that day? 
A. It was about 15 to 20 miles. 
Q. Okay. And were you drinking anything that day, 
Vodka or beer or anything? 
A. No. I had been working from 8 till 4 when I 
had just gotten off work. 
Q. Were you taking any medication, pain pills or 
drugs of any kind for any sickness or illness or anything? 
A. No. 
Q. No drugs. Okay. When was the first time as you 
came out of that 75 feet — you mentioned you saw a few 
other cars — 
A. Seventy-five yards, excuse me. 
Q. .Seventy-five yards. Okay. When you came out of 
that 75 yards, where was the first time in yards, was it 10 
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yards a 
you saw 
A. 
fter you turned out? When was the first time that 
my car? i 
Let's see, I seen a car in front of your car first.: 
I was probably, um, yardwise, it was before the first 
entrance to the video shop. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
the boa 
That you saw me, then? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
So how many yards from where you see my car on 
rd to where the first time that you saw me — would 
you estimate how many yards were you from the first time 
you saw 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
you saw 
A. 
ft 
A. 
me to where we hit? 
Twenty-five yards — 
And that was — 
Twenty-five. 
Twenty-five yards. Was that the first time that 
me? 
Yes, uh-huh. 
Okay. 
I had seen your car after — right behind the car 
that was in front of you* 
& 
A. 
j got to 
1
 ft 
A, 
And what did you think that I was trying to do? 
To turn left through the intersection before I 
the intersection. 
And did you see my turn signal? 
I don't remember if I had seen it or not. 
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THE COURT: Well, Mr. Mabey, you have to stop at 
some point and give the witness a chance to answer the 
question, 
STEVEN MABEY: All right, 
0. (By Mr. Steven Mabey) All right, when did you 
know that I was going to — 
THE COURT: All right. You've already asked it. 
Let her answer now. 
THE WITNESS: When you started into the intersec-
tion. 
Q. (By Mr. Steven Mabey) Okay. Then how many yards 
was that when you knew I was going to turn into the intersec-
tion? 
A. My car may have been one car length back from where 
he has my car drawn now. 
Q. At this back here? Okay. So at that time, did 
you push on your brakes at that point? 
A. When you were turning through the intersection? 
Q. Yeah, when you knew that I was turning, did you 
push on your brakes to stop for me or did you just keep 
going? 
A. I started to put on my brakes just before we — 
when I could see that you were not going to get through the 
intersection and we were going to hit, I put on my brakes. 
Q. So how many yards was it, or in feet, when you 
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thousand miles per month, normally, so I'm used to driving. 
So the main point is, is that I felt that I was clear, 
I looked all ways and I felt in my normal timing that no 
one would hit me at that time. 
I would have been going probably about 15 to 20 miles 
an hour. The gold car of Gretchen Goulding, in my opinion, 
what I believed happened is that she was speeding and did 
not judge my distance that day. I believe the speed would 
have been 30 to 40 plus miles an hour, probably in a hurry 
that day. 
And the next point is, is I believe she did not make 
an attempt to try to stop for me or slow down for me. As 
she stated in her testimony, she thought she had the 
right-of-way. 
I believe that — well, number one, that I was first 
in the intersection. 
Now, I want to show a couple of things on the board 
here about the accident. Well, first thing I want to show —-
how far does this microphone pick up? 
THE COURT: Well, it will pick up if you would 
talk in the — talk loud like you're doing now. 
STEVEN MABEY: Okay. On the board there's two 
things I'm going to show, which are very important, concern 
the skid marks and concern the point of the hit on my car, 
are the two points that I want to show on the car and where 
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the point of the front bumper of the pointed front of the 
Camaro car hit me. So therefore, the drawing is incorrect. 
My car would have been pointing straight, almost — it would 
have maybe had a very, very slight angle, but it was almost 
going straight into the road, which is Pioneer Road. 
Thirdly, my car was not in the middle of the intersectio 
as described. It was a little bit farther down, a few feet, 
or — well, probably a little more like the front line Ifm 
showing right here. 
So, the two points that I'm making, are the fact that 
I had already made my turn, so I was already well into my 
turn and she had plenty of visual view that day to see my 
car into the full turn. And I would maintain that she would 
have known from the distance from that exit to the time that 
I was in that road, I believe she would have had at least 
15 to 20-plus yards that she would have known that my car — 
because when I made my turn, I was making a turn towards 
going this direction, so there would have been an angle 
of turn that she would have known I wasn't going to go 
straight. And I believe that it would have been 15 to 20 
yards back that she would have saw me. So she had more 
than ample time to stop. 
The other point that I would like to put in my defense, 
your Honor, is the fact that the officer said on the court 
record that there were no skid marks, absolutely no skid 
n 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R . 
CKRTiriKO SHORTHAND RCPORTCR 
33 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
n 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
2d 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
marks of any kind when he 
a very major point 
and it pushed her . 
her if she hit the 
; hard. 
checked 
Because she s 
into — 
brakes 
she hit 
the accident, 
,tated she hit 
which is 
her brakes 
the brakes hard. I asked ; 
hard, she said she hi" 
Your Honor, there were no — 
I point, anywhere in 
is that she had pi 
she probably could 
here. 
enty of 
So what 
time to 
no skid marks 
I maintain, 
b the brakes 
at that 
your Honor, 
know that I was turning, 
have stopped at least one to two car 
lengths, at least one to two car lengths before she could 
have hit me as a normal driver would have in the — even 
in the most normal courtesy. 
So, I maintain, your Honor, that she was in a hurry 
that day, the Chrysler investigator maintains that it 
would have been a fairly hard impact, 30 or 40 miles an 
hour. It's a very deep gash, directly in the side of my 
car, so therefore, she did not try to stop. 
There were no skid marks. I maintain she was speeding, 
she was in a hurry to be downtown and there was a long 
distance she had to drive in a few minutes that day, your 
Honor. 
And I think that's just about it. "So I maintain 
that I was being courteous, I was first in the intersection, 
I was far into my turn, she had ample time to stop, did not 
stop, did not try to stop, was speeding. And the officer 
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matter that's just been asked. 
STEVEN MABEY: Oh, okay, just been asked. 
THE COURT: You can't rehash the other. 
STEVEN MABEY: Let's see. No, I don't have 
any more questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Both sides have rested, 
then, does either side wish to present closing argument, 
first, Mr. Shumway? 
MR. SHUMWAY: We'll waive opening argument. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Mabey? 
STEVEN MABEY: What did you want me to do now? 
THE COURT: Well, at the end of the case, each 
side has the right to present a summation or closing argument 
I realize you've done that substantially in your testimony, 
but I'm giving you that final right, if you wish to do so. 
STEVEN MABEY: Yeah, I do just want to say a couple 
of words here, because this is important to me. It has 
nothing to do with the girl involved, but again, the — the 
officer clearly, in a phone call I had to the officer, and 
from the paperwork and the testimony here in the trial today, 
did not measure the accident, did not find any skid marks. 
There was no rubber of any kind. Therefore, it is my belief 
that the girl, Gretchen Goulding, did not make any — 
absolutely did not make any attempt to try to stop. 
I believe that she was just in a hurry that day, her 
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speed picked up in speed, because she thought she may have 
been cleared and had the right-of-way, and it!s my belief 
that I was to the intersection — in -- first to the intersec 
tion. I was well into my turn. She had more than ample 
time, two or three car lengths, to come to a slow stop. 
There absolutely should have been no collision of any kind 
and I believe that I made the necessary turn signals and 
followed all the law that I should have followed in the 
accident. 
I was clear of all my faculties that day, no drugs, 
no drinking, I had been to that intersection over 100 
times with no problem before, any time going through that 
intersection and that intersection, because there1s no 
light and it's such a big intersection, I usually watch 
quite carefully when I go through that intersection, as 
to who's coming and going in that intersection. 
THE COURT: Any rebuttal? 
MR. SHUMWAY: I would just say, your Honor, that 
the evidence does not indicate an excessive speed on the 
part of either vehicle. There would have been cars spinning 
around and ending up over on the side of the road and that 
sort of thing. 
The testimony is that there was no evidence of speed, 
except some unclear evidence from the defendant. 
There is no reason why Mr. Mabey should not have yielded 
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the right-of-way, why he should be in the lane of car going 
straight ahead with no evidence of turning, why he should 
not have waited until she had safely cleared the intersec-
tion before he made his turn. 
The evidence is quite clear, in my opinion, that he has 
failed to yield the right-of-way to a car that had the right-
of-way, and he should be found guilty. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, the matter having 
been submitted, it does appear to the Court a clear-cut 
case under the facts and the law. The oncoming traffic 
on that street very clearly have the right-of-way, and 
what right-of-way means is the right to continue undisturbed, 
not having to put on the brakes or take any evasive action. 
A person turning in front does not obtain a right-of-
way to turn simply by either reaching the intersection first 
or starting to turn first. That person has the obligation 
to not, at any point, create an obstacle for the oncoming 
traffic. 
The fact that the accident occurred is presumptive 
evidence that you, Mr. Mabey, did not yield the right-of-
way • 
Now, the only thing that forfeits right-of-way is 
unlawful driving behavior by the oncoming traffic. In this 
speeding has been alleged. It does not appear to me from 
the accident, itself, and other circumstances and from the 
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direct testimony of the other driver that there was exces-
sive speed by either car. 
I would assume that the accident occurred because of 
failure to distracts — distract the attention or something 
of that nature on your part, but not excessive speed on the 
part of the oncoming traffic. Even if there had been, 
your testimony would have indicated that you either were 
or should have been aware of it, and therefore, it would not 
have been unexpected for you. And if that's true, then 
that would not constitute a defense. 
So I find you guilty under the facts of failure to 
yield right-of-way. 
Let's see, you failed to appear, apparently, within 
10 days. What was the reason for that? 
STEVEN MABEY: I was confined to my home with a 
severe laceration. I got 50 stitches across my head, I was 
taking medicine that day and could not get up here. I 
called the Court and told them that I had to have an exten-
sion on the case. I could not get here to the Court. 
THE COURT: Well, we show the call, but the 
call came about a month and a half later. How long were 
you confined to your home? 
STEVEN MABEY: Well, it wouldn't have been a month 
and a half later, because I did place the call that wasn't 
too long after that point in time. I'll go back to my recordfe, 
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